Estate of Egenious Coles v. Zucker, Goldberg & Ackerman by unknown
2016 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
7-12-2016 
Estate of Egenious Coles v. Zucker, Goldberg & Ackerman 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2016 
Recommended Citation 
"Estate of Egenious Coles v. Zucker, Goldberg & Ackerman" (2016). 2016 Decisions. 669. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2016/669 
This July is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2016 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
______________ 
 
No. 15-3104 
______________ 
 
ESTATE OF EGENIOUS COLES, by and through Frederick Coles, III, Executor, 
         Appellant 
 
v. 
 
ZUCKER, GOLDBERG & ACKERMAN;  
NATIONAL CITY MORTGAGE CO,  
d/b/a Eastern Mortgage Services;  
PNC MORTGAGE, the successor in interest  
to National City Mortgage Co. dba Eastern Mortgage Services; 
BALLARD SPAHR, LLP  
______________ 
 
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 3-14-cv-01612) 
District Judge: Honorable Freda L. Wolfson 
______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
June 21, 2016 
______________ 
 
Before: FISHER, GREENAWAY, JR. and ROTH, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Opinion Filed:  July 12, 2016) 
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______________ 
 
OPINION*  
______________ 
 
 
GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge. 
 
 Plaintiff-Appellant Frederick Coles, III, as executor of the estate of Egenious 
Coles (“Coles”), appeals the District Court’s judgment dismissing a complaint against 
Defendants-Appellees PNC Mortgage, successor in interest to National City Mortgage 
Co. (“National City”) d/b/a/ Eastern Mortgage Services, and Ballard Spahr LLP (“Ballard 
Spahr”).1  For the following reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment. 
 
I. Background2 
 In December 2004, Coles obtained a mortgage issued by National City, which was 
secured by real estate in Plainfield, New Jersey.  Coles made timely payments on the 
mortgage until March 2009 and, one month later, National City declared the mortgage in 
default.  Pursuant to the default, in May 2009, National City sent Coles a Notice of 
Intention to Foreclose designating itself as the lender on the mortgage.  Several months 
                                                 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
 
1 Appellant has chosen not to appeal the District Court’s dismissal of the 
complaint with respect to the remaining named defendant, Zucker Goldberg & Ackerman 
(“Zucker Goldberg”). 
 
2 As this matter is before us at the motion to dismiss stage, the following facts, 
which are taken from the allegations in the plaintiff’s complaint, are set forth as if true. 
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later, in August 2009, National City engaged law firm Zucker Goldberg to file a 
Foreclosure Complaint on National City’s behalf with the Superior Court of New Jersey.  
National City later retained Ballard Spahr to replace Zucker Goldberg as counsel in the 
matter.   
 Throughout the foreclosure litigation, National City represented to Coles through 
its counsel that it was the lender on her mortgage and that it had not assigned the 
mortgage.  However, Coles later learned that, contrary to National City’s representations, 
it had executed an Assignment of Mortgage dated June 2013 in favor of Wilmington 
Trust Company.  Coles contended that the Assignment of Mortgage document was a 
sham and that the mortgage was, in fact, assigned to Wilmington Trust Company before 
May 2005—well before National City commenced its foreclosure action against Coles.  
According to Coles, the foreclosure action brought by National City in its own name in 
August 2009 was a fraud because National City no longer owned Coles’s mortgage. 
 Based on National City’s alleged misrepresentations, Coles filed a federal 
complaint against, inter alia, PNC Mortgage, successor in interest to National City, and 
its counsel Ballard Spahr, alleging several violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices 
Act (“FDCPA” or the “Act”), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692f(1), 1692g(b), 1692d.  The District 
Court dismissed the complaint without prejudice against both defendants, concluding that 
Coles had not sufficiently pled that the defendants were “debt collectors” within the 
meaning of the FDCPA—a prerequisite to suit under the Act.  Appellant filed this timely 
appeal. 
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II. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review 
 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331.  We have 
appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Although we ordinarily do not have 
jurisdiction over a district court’s dismissal of a complaint without prejudice, Appellant 
has indicated an intention to “‘stand’ on the dismissed complaint” rather than re-file it 
and so the District Court’s judgment is final.  S.B. v. KinderCare Learning Ctrs., LLC, 
815 F.3d 150, 152 & n.1 (3d Cir. 2016). 
 We exercise plenary review over the District Court’s dismissal of the complaint.  
Connelly v. Lane Constr. Corp., 809 F.3d 780, 786 n.2 (3d Cir. 2016).  “[W]e must 
accept all well-pled allegations in the complaint as true and draw all reasonable 
inferences in favor of” the plaintiff.  Pearson v. Sec’y Dep’t of Corr., 775 F.3d 598, 604 
(3d Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Brown v. Card Serv. Ctr., 464 
F.3d 450, 452 (3d Cir. 2006)).  “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain 
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its 
face.”  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 
678 (2009)). 
 
III. Analysis 
 “To prevail on an FDCPA claim, a plaintiff must prove that (1) she is a consumer, 
(2) the defendant is a debt collector, (3) the defendant’s challenged practice involves an 
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attempt to collect a ‘debt’ as the Act defines it, and (4) the defendant has violated a 
provision of the FDCPA in attempting to collect the debt.”  Douglass v. Convergent 
Outsourcing, 765 F.3d 299, 303 (3d Cir. 2014).  The issue in this appeal is whether the 
complaint has sufficiently pled that PNC Mortgage and Ballard Spahr are “debt 
collectors.”  The FDCPA provides that a “debt collector” is “any person who uses any 
instrumentality of interstate commerce or the mails in any business the principal purpose 
of which is the collection of any debts, or who regularly collects or attempts to collect, 
directly or indirectly, debts owed or due or asserted to be owed or due another.”  15 
U.S.C. § 1692a(6). 
 Here, the complaint does not allege, even in a conclusory fashion, that PNC 
Mortgage is a “debt collector.”  Appellant nonetheless argues that the District Court erred 
in dismissing the complaint because an exhibit appended to the complaint (Exhibit B) 
demonstrates that PNC Mortgage regularly collects or attempts to collect debts owed to 
another.3  However, the complaint does not contain any reference to Exhibit B in this 
context and Appellant made no such argument before the District Court.  “It is axiomatic 
that arguments asserted for the first time on appeal are deemed to be waived . . . .”  In re 
Diet Drugs (Phentermine/Fenfluramine/Dexfenfluramine) Prod. Liab. Litig., 706 F.3d 
217, 226 (3d Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Tri-M Grp., LLC v. 
Sharp, 638 F.3d 406, 416 (3d Cir. 2011)).  In any event, we cannot fault the District 
                                                 
3 Appellant also asks us to take judicial notice of exhibits referenced by Exhibit B, 
but did not provide those additional exhibits to the District Court and does not provide 
those exhibits to this Court. 
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Court for failing to intuit the necessary factual allegations from one of the many exhibits 
appended to the complaint.  “Judges are not like pigs, hunting for truffles buried in the 
record.”  Doeblers’ Pa. Hybrids, Inc. v. Doebler, 442 F.3d 812, 820 n.8 (3d Cir. 2006) 
(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Albrechtsen v. Bd. of Regents Univ. of Wis. 
Sys., 309 F.3d 433, 436 (7th Cir. 2002)). 
 Moreover, the FDCPA exempts from the definition of “debt collector,” inter alia, 
“any person collecting or attempting to collect any debt owed or due or asserted to be 
owed or due another to the extent such activity . . . concerns a debt which was originated 
by such person.”  15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6)(F)(ii) (emphasis added).  As the complaint itself 
acknowledges, PNC Mortgage (as successor in interest to National City) was the 
originator of the mortgage at issue.  See J.A. 28 ¶ 7.  Appellant provides no argument as 
to why the originator exemption does not apply in this case.  Therefore, the District Court 
correctly dismissed the complaint with respect to PNC Mortgage. 
 As to Ballard Spahr, the complaint alleges, in a conclusory fashion, that the law 
firm is a “debt collector” by quoting the relevant definition from the FDCPA.  However, 
beyond this legal conclusion, the complaint provides no factual allegations that suggest 
Ballard Spahr regularly collects or attempts to collect debts owed to another.  See 
Connelly, 809 F.3d 790.  And Appellant provides no further argument on appeal other 
than to again recite the statutory definition of “debt collector.”  “[M]ere ‘[t]hreadbare 
recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by conclusory statements’ are 
insufficient to survive a motion to dismiss.”  Pearson, 775 F.3d at 604 (second alteration 
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in original) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678).  Accordingly, the District Court correctly 
dismissed the complaint with respect to Ballard Spahr.  
 
IV. Conclusion 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment dismissing 
the complaint, without prejudice. 
